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What makes a system 
complex? 
• # of decisions that have to be made regarding design 
• Complexity of operational environment 
• Degree of control (Centralized, decentralized, etc.) 
• Complexity of objectives (#, inconsistency, etc.) 
• Implications of design decisions less predictable 
• Change at any level may have system-wide impacts 
• Lateral influences stronger and more dominant than 
hierarchical relationships 
• Risk dominated by system-level risk (rather than local 
risk) 
• Small causes can have large effects 

Complexity vs. Complication 
Degree of Independence 
• In a complicated system, various elements that make up the 
system maintain a degree of independence from one another.  
Removing one element does not fundamentally alter the system’s 
behavior apart from that which directly resulted from the piece that 
was removed. 
• Complexity arises when the dependencies among the elements 
become important. Removing an element destroys system behavior 
to an extent that goes well beyond what is embodied in that element. 
 
Inherent Nature 




• Complicated systems are reducible, whereas complex ones are not. 
Complex Systems Engineering 
• Why is there a need for Complex Systems Engineering? 
• TSE = Traditional Systems Engineering 
• CSE = Complex Systems Engineering 
 
Traditional System Complex System 
 
Hierarchical Relationships dominate 
lateral influences 
Lateral influences dominate 
hierarchical relationships 
Cause and effect are relatively obvious 
and direct 
Cause and effect are not obvious and 
direct; Small causes can have large 
effects 
The implications of design decisions 
are relatively predictable 
The implications of design decisions 
are much less predictable 
Risks are dominated by the local risks 
in achieving the contributing parts 
Risks are dominated by system risks, 
with unforeseen emergent properties 
 Influences on, and implications of, 
decisions tend to follow the local 
partitioning of the solution elements 
Influences on, and implications of, 
decisions are much more difficult to 
bound and to establish 
Emergence 
• A classical systems principle 
• Emergence holds that patterns and properties in a complex 
system will come about (emerge) through operation of the 
system 
• These patterns and properties cannot be anticipated 
beforehand and are not capable of being deduced from 






- Potential advantage: higher-level functionality emerging from 
engineered elements comprising a complex system 
- Potential risk:  possible emerging behavior that is 
unpredictable and unexpected 
 
…also known as the “law of unintended 
consequences” 
Emergent Properties 
Emergent Properties in General: 
• System-level properties exist only at the system level as it functions, being 
different from and existing beyond the constituent element properties 
• System-level properties are not held by any of the isolated elements 
• System-level properties are irreducible.  They simply cannot be understood, 
explained, or inferred from the structure or behavior of constituent elements or 
their local properties 
• Understanding the cause-effect relationships can only be established through 
retrospective interpretation.  This renders traditional reduction-based analytic 
techniques incapable of useful predictions of emergent system-level behavior 
• Emergent patterns are not adequately understood without the appreciation of the 
context within which the patterns exist 
 
Emergent Properties for Future BMC2: 
• Enhanced situational awareness (due to optimized sensor resource management) 
is an emergent property.  As sensors are better allocated, the “picture” or 
information will improve.  So it becomes a self-improving cycle of capabilities. 
• Force-level capabilities, such as Integrated Fire Control (IFC) 
 
 
“…only complex systems can perform 
complex tasks” [Braha, Minai, & Bar-Yam, 2006] 
Example:  BMC2 as a Complex 
System of Systems 
Future BMC2 
BMC2 is the command, control, and management of warfare 
assets. 
 
Depending on the operational need, BMC2 can range from a 
single unit (platform) using only local resources to many 
distributed units functioning collaboratively for the benefit 
of the group (or Force). 
 
The success of Joint combat operations depends on the 




A significant leap in operational capability (force multiplier) 
will result from achieving a force-level warfighting 
paradigm that optimizes the use of the resources for the 
needs of the force. 
Future Collaborative BMC2 
Shifting to a collaborative “big picture” system 
of systems arrangement for the BMC2 of the 
future 
 This shift takes maximum advantage of the distributed 
warfare assets for the needs of the whole 
 
Example:  collaborative BMC2 can select the best shooter 
(weapon system) from the Force of distributed firing units 
Future BMC2 Vision 
[1] Implement a System of Systems (SoS) architecture that 
distributes the “intelligence” among the warfare units  
 
[2] Each warfare unit is a “system” within the SoS 
 
[3] Each system contains a common set of intelligent 
algorithms and processors  
 
[4] All data and information is shared among the systems 
 
[5] Each system within the SoS is empowered and 
equipped to operate as an intelligent agent—to make 
warfare decisions from a force-level perspective 
Each system within the SoS is an intelligent agent    


























External to the SoS 
Warfighting Units 
•  The warfare resources are considered the “systems”; the SoS will be the 
collaborative utilization and employment of them for the good of the whole.  
•  Each warfighting unit implements an “intelligent node” with identical/ common 
processing  to perform BMC2 functionality. 
•  A “system” is defined as the intelligent node integrated with a unit’s warfare 
resources. 
•  The distributed systems interact (collaborate/communicate) by sharing information 
with all other systems over a network.   













The philosophy, simply stated, is that common processing algorithms 
provided with identical data & information input will produce identical 
picture, assessment, and decision results. 
Common Processing Philosophy 




Each System processes input 
using common algorithms 
Shared SA 
Identical input 
for each System 











A Priori Knowledge 
Intel, Maps, etc. 







Each System processes 

























Each System produces 
identical results 3 
Input to the 
Distributed System 
Identical input 
for each System  1 
A Priori Knowledge 
Intel, Maps, etc. 
Take the “Common Processing”  Philosophy One Step Further:   
Equip each system with common decision-making and advanced data 
fusion algorithms, which when fed identical track pictures (or data sets), 
allows each to produce identical resource tasking recommendations.  
Doctrine, Rule-
sets, TTPs 
Common Processing for BMC2 
Situational Awareness 
Integrated Fire Control (IFC) refers to the participation and 
coordination of multiple non-collocated warfare assets in tactical 
engagements of enemy targets 
• IFC is the ability to develop fire control solutions from information provided by 
remote sensors 
• IFC expands the weapon’s effective kinematic range by removing dependency on 
range limits of the local sensors 
• Future advances in aerospace warfare depend largely on IFC – the collaborative use 
of distributed warfare assets for time-critical aerospace engagements.   
Emergent Capabilities (Payoffs)  
Payoffs of Future BMC2 Collaboration: 
• Improved chance of interception (by selecting the optimal engagement geometry) 
• Selection of the best shooter from the distributed warfare assets 
• Expansion of the battle space to the effective kinematic ranges of the weapons 
• Removes dependency on range limits of the organic/dedicated sensors 
• Improved economy of weapon resources (by reducing redundant shots) 
• Faster reaction times (earlier launch decisions possible) 
• Sharing engagement control – forward pass 
• Off-board engagement support for guidance relay and target illumination 
• Enhanced defense against complex threat environments (sophisticated or 
significant numbers of aerospace targets) – IFC may be a necessity for victory 
Exploring the 
Complexity of Future 
BMC2 
Definitions of Complexity 
 
• Complexity in future BMC2 systems dependent on: 
– # of participating warfare assets 
– complexity of operational environment 
– level of collaboration (& interoperability) achieved 
– Achievement of a decentralized architecture to empower elements and avoid 
central control 
 
• Sophisticated information processing inherent in future BMC2 
 
• Adaptation achieved through predictive capabilities—threat 




First Definition of Complexity:  “…a system in which large 
networks of components with no central control and simple rules of 
operation give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated 




• Nontrivial emergent behavior is the central objective and payoff of 
creating a networked collaborative BMC2 system of systems 
 
• Emergent behavior would include:  utilization of warfare resources 
at the force-level and shared situational awareness  
 
• Self-organization refers to the ability of the components of a 
complex system to create organized behavior without an internal or 
external controller. 
 
• Future warfare resources could self-organize given adaptable BMC2 





Definitions of Complexity 
(cont.) 
Second Definition:  “…a system that exhibits nontrivial emergent 
and self-organizing behaviors.” 
Characteristics of Complex 
Systems 
•  Complex Collective Behavior 
•  Signaling & Information Processing 
•  Adaptation 
•  Design Decisions 
•  Complex Objectives 
•  Complex Operational Environment 
•  System Changes 
•  Lateral Influences 
•  System Risk 
•  Unforeseen Emergent Properties 
Common characteristics of complex systems.  To what extent does 
the future BMC2 system of systems have these characteristics? 
Complex Collective Behavior 
The collective action of the large numbers of 
components gives rise to the complex, 
hard-to-predict, changing patterns of 
behavior 
 
The overall behavior of collaborative warfare 
resources would change in response to 
the complex operational environment and 
hard-to-predict in terms of which action 
might be taken by each individual 
element  
Signaling & Information 
Processing 
Complex systems produce and use information 
and signals from their internal and external 
environments 
 
Information production, sharing, and usage is 
key for collaborative BMC2.  Types of 
information include:  sensor data, 
environmental data, intelligence, health & 
status information 
Adaptation 
Complex systems adapt—they change their behavior to improve their 
changes of survival or success through learning or evolutionary 
processes 
 
Adapting to a constantly changing operational environment 
• Future warfare threat environments will be complex and constantly changing. 
• Additionally, the SoS itself will be constantly changing as its systems join and leave the 
SoS; as systems move; and as warfare resources change in time 
• Therefore, the future BMC2 SoS  will constantly find itself in unique and changing 
circumstances. 
• Future BMC2 SoS behavior is adaptive as it responds to the threat environment and seeks 
to best utilize all of its warfare resource elements. 
 
Characteristics of Future BMC2 Adaptation 
• Adaptation can occur at system-level and force-level.  
• Adaptation takes the form of changes to rules of operation/engagement, etc., doctrine, TTP’s 
• Adaptation can also take the form of the creation of new SoS’s; acquiring additional systems 
into the SoS; dropping systems from a SoS 
Design Decisions 
For complex systems, a significantly large number of decisions have to be 
made regarding design, and typically the implications of design 
decisions are less predictable 
 
Future BMC2 is based on a multitude of design decisions: 
•  micro-level (for each warfare resource)  
•  element level (integrating multiple warfare  resources on platforms) 
•  the macro level (designing the system of systems architecture and 
force-level decision process) 
 
Examples:  common processing software, communications, decision process 
that governs resource allocation, interactions, and responses to the threat 
environment 
 
The outcome of the future BMC2 system is the response of the warfare 
resources to the operational mission.  Based on the design complexity and 
the complexity of the operational environment, this outcome is necessarily 
unpredictable, unique, and changing in time. 
Complex Objectives 
Complex systems have a large number of objectives and the 
objectives are generally inconsistent or changing. 
 
Mission objectives include: 
- Meeting the operational needs of different warfare areas 
based on threat present (i.e., air and missile defense, 
surface warfare, subsurface warfare, cruise missiles, 
asymmetric warfare, special operations, etc.) 
- Addressing a set of objectives that are changing in time 
(priorities among threat change as combat environment 
unfolds) 
- Meeting the operational objectives of individual 
platforms as well as those at the force-level 
 
Conflicting objectives can arise from either of these types 
of mission objectives 
Complex Operational 
Environment 
Complex systems exist to operate in complex operational environments.  
The complexity of the operational environment may be a result of 
adverse environments, widely varying environments, or environments 
that cause challenging missions. 
 
The operational environment for future BMC2 operations is envisioned 
to be highly complex and could include a combination of multiple 
and fast-moving air, missile, land, and space-based threats. 
 
The threat may be sequential or simultaneous and may come from 
various directions 
 
Threats may include unmanned vehicles, swarms of manned or 
unmanned vehicles, asymmetric attacks, or unconventional attacks 
disguised as a non-threat 
 
 
Complexity in BMC2 Operations 
Ultimately, every moment in the operational life 
of the BMC2 system will be unique. 
All aspects are changing: 
- Threats 
- Participating warfare resources/units 
- Status/health/capabilities of warfare 
resources 
- Locations of units, threats, etc. 
- Threat/mission priorities 




For complex systems, change at any level may have system-wide 
impacts and small causes may have large effects. 
 
Changes include:  inputs to the system; changes in the health or 
status of warfare resources, or the addition or deletion of 
participating warfare resources to a system of systems. 
Inputs include:  operational environment data (sensor data, intel, 
weather/maps, weapon loads and status, health and status of 
warfare resources, etc.), changes in operating rules (TTPs, rules 
of engagement, decision rules, etc.), and operator input 
System-wide impacts; or force-level emergent capabilities include:  
identification of new threats, changes to tasking priorities, 
selection of best shooter, etc.) 
 
Therefore, system changes and changes to inputs can impact the 




“In its highest state, shared context and understanding is implicit and 
intuitive between hierarchical and lateral echelons of command, 
enabling decentralized and distributed formations to perform as if 
they were centrally coordinated.  When achieved, these practices 
result in decentralized formal decision-making throughout the 
force, leading implicitly to the opportunity to gain advantageous 
operational tempo over adversaries.” 
 
“Decentralization will occur beyond current comfort levels and habits of 
practice.” 
       - Quotes from CJCS Paper on Joint Force 2020 (April 2012) 
 
•  Empowering  individual warfare  units (systems) as 
intelligent agents with the force-level BMC2 capability (to arrive 
at force-optimized tasking for warfare resources) creates an 
emphasis on lateral influences over vertical 
In complex systems, lateral influences are stronger and more 
dominant that hierarchical influences 
System Risk 
In complex systems, risk is dominated by system-level 
risks, rather than lower level risks in achieving the 
contributing parts. 
 
For the future BMC2, the risk shifts from individual 
warfare resources operating independently, to the 
collaborative system of systems. 
Lower level risks, such as whether an individual warfare 
asset will function properly become less of an issue as 
the number of participating warfare resources 
participate 
The risk shifts to system-level concerns, such as: 
 - whether information is being communicated properly 
 - whether situational awareness is shared and accurate 
 - whether the force-level decision process for tasking 
resources is behaving properly 
Unforeseen Emergent 
Properties 
Complex systems exhibit unforeseen or hard-to-predict 
emergent properties. 
 
If such properties are truly unforeseen, then it 
remains to be seen whether the future BMC2 
system of systems will behave in unpredictable 
ways 
Since weapon systems are involved, it is imperative 
that modeling and testing occur to investigate 
unforeseen emergent properties 
BMC2 Complexity Principles 
Principles that Apply to 
Complex Systems 
• System Holism Principle 
• Darkness Principle 
• 80-20 Principle 
• Law of Requisite Variety 
• Redundancy of Resources Principle 
• Sub-optimization Principle 
• Relaxation Time Principle 
• Redundancy of Potential Command 
Principle 
System Holism 
A system has holistic properties not manifested by any of its 
parts and their interactions: vertical emergence.  System 
holism widely known as “the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts” 
 
- Holistic properties of future BMC2 systems:  force-level 
capabilities made possible through the collaborative 
interactions of their parts 
 
- Examples:  enhanced and shared situational awareness, 
distributed sensor and weapon management for force-level 




 The darkness principle in complexity is the concept of incompressibility:  
no system can be known completely.   The darkness principle implies that 
members of a complex system do not have knowledge of the system as a 
whole:  they will always be in the shadow of the whole. 
 
“Each element in the system is ignorant of the behavior of the system as a 
whole, it responds only to information that is available to it locally.  This 
point is vitally important.  If each element “knew” what was happening to 
the system as a whole, all of the complexity would have to be present in 
that element.”  
 
For future BMC2 with the existence of common processing resident in each 
warfare element and shared information, each element of the complex 
system gains a complete understanding of the whole system. This 
implies that the system complexity is present in each element.  Thus, 




According to the 80-20 principle, in any large complex system, 80% 
of the output will be produced by only 20% of the system. 
 
This principle can be evaluated in terms of future BMC2 in two 
different ways: 
(1) The point of collaborative BMC2 is to best coordinate 
distributed warfare assets.  So, the output of the system—the 
decisions or commands to task resources (or launch weapons) 
will reduce the number of tasked resources to a smaller 
fraction.  As an example, the optimum weapon can be selected 
to engage a target; rather than each weapon system 
independently defending against a threat. 
(2) On the other hand, for the envisioned BMC2 system, each 
node in the network is performing identical processing to 
develop the force-level tasking of the warfare resources.  So, 
from this perspective, the decision outputs are being generated 
at each participating common node.  So, from this perspective, 
100% of the output is produced by 100% of the system.  Thus, 
a significant amount of redundancy is designed into the 
decentralized architecture that is envisioned. 
 
Law of Requisite Variety 
- “Control can only be obtained if the variety of the controller is 
at least as great as the variety of the situation to be controlled. 
- A variation:  “…every good regulator of a system must contain 
a complete representation of that system.” 
 
The future BMC2 system complies with this complexity 
principle.  With common processors, each warfare element 
attains information superiority through the common operational 
picture which contains shared situational awareness, health 
and status information of the warfare resources, and identical 
rule sets.  So, each warfare element is empowered with the 
variety of the situation and therefore has the ability to “control” 
(or arrive at the optimum resource tasking solution) warfare 
assets at the force-level. 
Redundancy of Resources 
Principle 
  Maintenance of stability under conditions of disturbance requires redundancy of critical resources    
 
System stability is a concern for the future BMC2 system.  Disturbances 
include: 
• an overload of information or data 
• false or corrupt data 
• outages/communication failures 
• a threat environment so complex that the number of resource 
tasks overloads the decision prioritization process 
• delays that could slow the tasking process down to the point where 
the reaction time is not met 
 
System redundancy that could address these types of disturbances 
include : 
• redundant links (communication paths) 
• the redundancy of the common processors at each element 
• the ability to synchronize information among elements 
 
Sub-optimization Principle 
 If each subsystem, regarded separately, is made to operate with 
maximum efficiency, the system as a whole will not operate 
with utmost efficiency.  And the reverse:  if the whole is made 
to operate with maximum efficiency, the comprising 
subsystems will not operate with upmost efficiency.  Another 
way to think about this:  parts in isolation behave differently 
from parts that are connected to a system and/or an 
environment 
 
The sub-optimization principle readily applies to the BMC2 system.  If individual 
warfare platforms are considered subsystems, then it is easy to imagine that 
if the platforms are each operating as they would in isolation; then given 
threats in the environment, each would fire weapons to engage the targets.    
Examining the reverse implies that if the system is made to operate at maximum 
efficiency at the force-level, then the warfare platforms will not be operating 
at maximum efficiency.  This situation would be the intent; since fewer 
weapons would have to be fired and sensors could share in the creation of 
the common operational picture. 
 
Relaxation Time Principle 
 System stability is possible only if the system’s relaxation 
time is shorter than the mean time between disturbances 
 
 Application of this principle to the future BMC2 system is 
critical to the success and stability of the system: 
- the speed of communications, processing, decision-
making, synchronizations, and generation of resource 
tasking.   
- the tempo of the “disturbances” on threats must be 
understood: the speed, location, and numbers of 
threats and the resulting system reaction times 
necessary to address the threats.   
- the correlation between the system tempo and the threat 
tempo—ensuring there is a built-in time for “relaxation” 






Redundancy of Potential 
Command 
In any complex decision network, the potential to act effectively is 
conferred by an adequate concatenation of information.  This 
means that to “control” a complex system we must at first have 
a sufficiently good representation of it.  
 
The future BMC2 system of systems upholds this principle.  One 
of the major outcomes is shared situational awareness among 
the distributed warfare nodes.  This constitutes the adequate 
concatenation of information or self-knowledge of the 
operational environment and the system itself. 
CSE Applications 
for BMC2 
Designing Complex Man-Made 
Systems 
CSE does not “…primarily seek to produce predictable, stable 
behavior within carefully constrained situations, but rather to 
obtain systems capable of adaptation, change, and novelty—
even surprise!” [Braha, Minai, and Bar-Yam, 2006] 
“Many engineering applications, such as real-time decision 
support, communications and control, are reaching the point 
where classical methods are no longer feasible for reasons of 
system interdependencies and complexity.” [Bar-Yam, 2004] 
“As systems become increasingly large and must seamlessly 
interoperate with other systems in ways that were never 
envisioned, system engineers are bumping into the limits of 
the tenets, principles, and practices traditionally used in 
systems engineering.”  [Brian White, 2001] 
Complex Systems Engineering 
• Why is there a need for Complex Systems Engineering? 
• TSE = Traditional Systems Engineering 
• CSE = Complex Systems Engineering 
 
Traditional System Complex System 
 
Hierarchical Relationships dominate 
lateral influences 
Lateral influences dominate 
hierarchical relationships 
Cause and effect are relatively obvious 
and direct 
Cause and effect are not obvious and 
direct; Small causes can have large 
effects 
The implications of design decisions 
are relatively predictable 
The implications of design decisions 
are much less predictable 
Risks are dominated by the local risks 
in achieving the contributing parts 
Risks are dominated by system risks, 
with unforeseen emergent properties 
 Influences on, and implications of, 
decisions tend to follow the local 
partitioning of the solution elements 
Influences on, and implications of, 
decisions are much more difficult to 
bound and to establish 
CSE Methods 
How can we deal with complexity in a 
predictable way? 
1. Identify when a system and/or its 
solution is complex 
2. Determine level of complexity (or 
relative complexity) 
3. Determine when enough SE has 
been done; and when level of 
confidence in design (and 
predictable behavior) is acceptable 
[Calvano, 2004] 
“Highly integrated systems exhibit more 
complex interactions across the system 
than earlier, simpler systems.  In the 
highly integrated system, the designer 
must consider effects on all parts of the 
system.  We are therefore engineering 
at the systems level more 
fundamentally than ever; as opposed to 
introducing subsystems into an 
evolved, well-precedented system 
structure.” [Calvano, 2004] 
Adopt an evolutionary paradigm for CSE 
that involves rapid parallel 
exploration and a context designed to 
promote change through competition 
between design/implementation 
groups with field testing of multiple 
variants.  [Bar-Yam, 2003] 
1.   Design the environment and 
processes by which the system is 
going to be created (not designing the 
system itself). 
2.   Design components of the system for 
the system as a whole. 
3.   Design a set of rules about how 
components engage with one another 
and the process of change. 
[White, 2001] 
CSE Considerations 
• Design until an acceptable degree of confidence is met 
• Attempt to deal with complexity in a predictable way 
• Engineer at the system level—gain an understanding of the 
whole and emphasize lateral interactions rather than 
hierarchical 
• Adopt an Evolutionary Paradigm with rapid parallel exploration 
and competition between design/implementation groups to test 
multiple variants 
• Utilize best practices from TSE and CSE: 
 
“[Traditional] systems engineering and complex system engineering 
live together.  Treating them separately doesn’t make any sense.  
CSE builds on the capabilities of TSE but has its own unique 




Should CSE methods be considered 
for future BMC2? 
 
• The complexity characteristics of future 
BMC2 pose serious challenges that may 
exceed the limits of TSE 
• Complexity in the objectives results in a 
BMC2 system of systems that is hard to 
bound 
• Generating a well-defined set of mission 
objectives and system requirements is very 
challenging 
• There is much complexity involved in design 
decisions (large scope and unpredictability of 
design decision outcomes) 
Taking Advantage of Complexity 
In addition to trying to cope with the scope and 
complexity of the future BMC2 system, engineering 
strategies must also strive to ensure designs take 
advantage of the benefits that complexity offers. 
 
- Designs should not limit features such as redundancy, sub-
optimization, and the 80-20 principle 
 
- These may seem wasteful, inefficient, and costly; but they 
may be the key to the stability and response times necessary 
to function in a complex environment 
 
- Benefits also include adaptation, self-organization, and agility 
Conclusions 
• Future BMC2 has many characteristics 
of complexity and follows many 
principles of system complexity 
• The system engineering of future BMC2 
should adopt a mix of CSE and TSE 
methods 
• SE approaches adopted should not limit 
or constrain the benefits of the complex 




• Understand and quantify the BMC2 system tempo, the threat 
environment tempo, and analyze and compare the tempos to 
identify disconnects 
• Determine what a sufficient level of systems engineering 
completeness would be – develop a strategy to determine 
when the level of confidence in the design is acceptable 
• Study the 80/20 principle as it applies to BMC2.  What 
percentage of the system output will be produced by what 
percentage of the system? 
• Predict and understand emergent properties 
• Study the overall system stability against “disturbances” – is 
there enough redundancy and sub-optimization to 
compensate for disturbances? 
• Study what sufficiency in representation (situational 
awareness) is required to support action (resource tasking). 
 
In conclusion, the potential complex threat 
environment of the future and the mission 
need to provide defensive measures and 
tactical responses have created a need for a 
future BMC2 system that can perform 
complex tasks.  And, only a complex BMC2 
system can perform complex BMC2 tasks!  
 















Typing & Tracking 
Information 
The “effective engagement envelope” will greatly 
expand as the shift takes place from a single 
warfighting unit using only local sensor and weapon 
resources to a system of collaborating warfighting 
units.  The shared sensor data will enhance 
situational awareness; thereby extending the 
detection envelope and improving the reaction time 
of weapons deployment—which will extend the 
effective range of engagements. 
Effective Engagement 
Envelope (E3) 
The ability to select the optimum weapon to employ from 
across the force (rather than being limited to a single 
unit) will improve the economy of weapons resources and 
the probability of effective engagements. 
Characteristics: 
•  High bandwidth, Secure, Reliable     
•  Timely sharing of data and information among units 
•  Adaptable to accept or drop units   
•  Employ authentication measures to ensure authoritative data sources 
Future BMC2 Information Architecture 
Data Exchange Characteristics: 
• Supports real-time  exchange of sensor 
measurement data 
• Broadcast/Multicast/Point-to-Point 
• Non-real-time traffic for operations control 
• Link monitoring 
• Quality of Service delivery 
• Data integrity and confidentiality 
• Bandwidth allocation/monitoring 
• Data dissemination prioritization (for time-
sensitive data or bandwidth constraints) 
• Ad hoc nodal topology (nodes can easily join 
or leave network) 
•Interfaces with Tactical Data Links (TDLs) 
Information Dissemination Capabilities: 
• Determines needs of information-recipient users or 
decision nodes (data advertisements/ subscriptions) 
• Tracks data availability 
• Establishes routing paths & maintains connectivity 
• Optimizes bandwidth usage 
• Determines feasibility of transmission/checks link status 
• Sends and receives commands to/from remote link 
managers to control, manage, & synchronize transmission 
• Transmits data/information according to local/remote 
synchronized commands 
Objectives for Information Sharing: 
Based on Force-centric de-centralized architecture 
• Allows warfare resources to be managed according to 
Force-level needs (rather than unit-centric needs) 
• Manages network to enable special data distribution 
needs during engagements. (higher data rate or 
throughput) 
Information Exchange Required: 
• Associated Measurement Reports 
• Resource information:  HSCC 
• C2 Datasets (Doctrine, TTPs, plans, manual 
commands) 
• Resource Tasking Requests 
• Resource Commitment “Handshakes” 
Information Architecture 
Capabilities 
Object Context Assessment 
• Estimate object relations 
• Refine object ID & typing 
based on group behavior 
• Provide physical context for 
track picture 
• Discrimination, kill 
assessment 




Assessment of sensors, 
weapons, & warfighting 
units 
• Health & status 
assessment 
• Configuration & 
capability maintenance 
Environment Assessment 
• Develop & maintain 
environmental picture (weather, 
mapping, jamming, etc.) for 
Area of Interest (AOI) 
C2 Situation Assessment 
Assessment & Adoption of 
Blue Force BMC2 inputs 
• Ensure peer promulgation 
of commands 
• Translate BMC2 inputs 
into system operating rules, 
constraints, & parameters  
Threat Evaluation 
• Identify, evaluate, & 
prioritize threats 
Processing Evaluation 
• Assessment of 
processing performance 
• Unit health & status 
assessment 
Force Readiness Assessment 
Fusion of assessments 
• Determination of overall 
readiness of warfighting forces 
Shared SA Data Processing & Fusion 
Shared SA relies on: 
Data processing and data fusion algorithms to assess and develop 
a representation of the real situation  
Situation Assessment Capabilities 
Tracking & Combat ID 
• Pixel/Signal-level association 
• Object kinematics 
• Object characterization 
• Object kinematics prediction 
SA Certification 
• Assessment of track quality 
• Assessment of track ID confidence 
• Certification of fire control quality SA 
A need exists for new approaches for 
engineering SoS’s because of: 
 
(1) An exponential rise in the demand, 
accessibility and proliferation of information 
(2) Increasing requirements for interdependence 
between systems that have previously been 
conceived, developed, and deployed as 
independently functioning systems 
(3) Demands for engineering solutions willing to 
trade completeness for accelerated deployment 
(4) Holistic solutions that exist beyond technical 
resolution 
SoSE 
Methodology vs. Process 
There are 6 primary conditions that suggest a 
methodology may be preferable to traditional SE 
approaches (processes) for SoS’s: 
 
1. Turbulent Environmental Conditions (environment is 
highly dynamic, uncertain, rapidly changing) 
2. Ill-defined Problem Conditions (in dispute, not readily 
accessible, or lack of consensus) 
3. Contextual Dominance (the technical “hard” aspects are 
overshadowed by the contextual “soft” (circumstances, 
conditions, factors) aspects) 
4. Uncertain Approach (path of how “best” to proceed is 
indeterminate) 
5. Ambiguous Expectations and Objectives (inability to 
establish measure of success or system objectives) 
6. Excessive Complexity (system boundaries are expansive 
such that the level of complexity is beyond the capabilities of 
traditional SE approaches) 
 
Shared Situation Awareness 
… is key because each unit needs identical, complete, accurate, & 
timely awareness (knowledge) of the operational situation. 
Threat Picture 
The identification, evaluation, and 
prioritization of  threat objects 
Track Picture 
Fundamental track & combat 
identification data 
representation of  all objects in 
the environment 
 
Defended Assets Picture 
The location, status, & prioritization of all 
defended assets (ground, maritime, & aerospace; 
as well as Blue Force, Coalition, & Civilian)).  
Includes defended objects and zones as well as 
points or areas on the ground within an area of 
interest.  
 
Object Context Picture 
Estimates of the group behavior 
of threat objects.    
 
Environmental Picture 
Meteorological, electromagnetic jamming, & 
atmospheric information concerning the 
battle space area of interest.    
C2 Situation Picture 
Decision-maker commands, assigned 
missions of warfighting units, 
doctrine, Tactics Techniques and 
Procedures (TTPs), location and status 
of warfare units and network 
 
Warfare Resources Picture 
The location, Health, Status, Configuration, 
and Capability (HSCC) information of each 
warfare resource (sensors, weapons, and 
warfighting units).  
Shared Situation Awareness (SA) is the ability of distributed units 
(systems) to gain an understanding of the totality of the operational 
environment including the tactical situation, the threat, the defended 
assets, the readiness of warfighting resources, and command and control 
constraints within which the systems must operate.    
Distributed Resource Management… 
… is key to enabling and optimizing the use of distributed 
resources for collaborative BMC2 and integrated fire control 
Shared Knowledge of Warfare Resources 
Engagement support strategies 
- Threat detection/cue 
- Fire Control Quality data 
availability 
- Sensor tasking/commitment 
- Preferred sensor arrangement 
Weapon-target pairing 
- Preferred shooter 
determination 
- Engageability of weapon 
options 
Selective engagement 
- Selection of best option 
if multiple engagement 
options along the threat 
trajectory exist 
Engagement support strategy after launch 
- Forward pass (preferred eng control option) 
- Remote guidance relay (preferred sensor arrangement) 





- Receive threat determination 
- Assess engageability of weapon options 
- Determine intercept probability 
- Decide to launch (or not) 
• Based on the use of automated decision aids to determine and recommend 
optimum uses of warfare resources 
• Using identical automated decision aids on distributed units enables decisions to 
be made in a timely manner to support time-critical engagement operations. 
• Each distributed unit uses distributed resource management (DRM) to determine 
tasks for all resources within the operational environment 
• Resident operators can override resource tasking recommendations for local 








Health, Status, Configuration, 























   Refinement 
Augmented Track States 




Object Context Assessment 
(Level 2 Data Fusion) 
• Estimate object relations 
• Refine object based on group behavior 
• Provide physical context for track picture 
• Discrimination, kill assessment 
Warfighting Resource 
Assessment 
Assessment of sensors, 
weapons, & warfighting units 
• Health & status assessment 
• Configuration & capability 
maintenance 
• Status and capability 
prediction 
Environment Assessment 
Assessment of op environment 
(weather, jamming, etc.) 
• Maintain weather, mapping, 
jamming, etc. pictures for AOI 
• Predict environmental picture 
BMC2 Situation Assessment 
Assessment of BMC2 Operating Rules, 
mission plans, TTPs, Doctrine, BMC2 info 
• Ensure promulgation of BMC2 datasets 
• Assess effects of BMC2 datasets on COA 
• Translate BMC2 info into datasets usable 
by automated decision aids 
Tracking & Combat ID 
(Level 1 Data Fusion) 
• Pixel/Signal-level association 
• Object kinematics 
• Object characterization 
• Object kinematics prediction 
Distributed Resource 
Management 
(Level 4 Data Fusion) 
• Translate prioritized COA 
actions into resource tasks 
• Generate allocation options 
and select optimum 
• Issue tasks to warfighting 
resources 
BMC2 
     Datasets 
Operators* Commanders* 
Wargaming (Level 3 Data Fusion) 
(Event/Consequence Prediction) 
• Identify, evaluate, & prioritize 
defensive & offensive actions (COA 
evaluation) 
• Predict enemy Course of Action (COA) 
Prioritized Threat List 
Threat Evaluation 




COA List Environ 
picture 
Resource Info Set 
Sensor assessments & 
Warfighting Unit HSCC 
Weather/Mapping/ 
Intel Sources 
*note:  Human System 
Integration (HSI) interaction 
not shown in this diagram—
only fully-automated mode 
shown for simplicity 
Knowledge & Decision Products 
Example:  each distributed unit uses “common” algorithms to produce identical Force-level engagement 
recommendations.  Therefore, each unit arrives at the same conclusion that a particular weapon has the best 
shot and that a particular sensor (not necessarily collocated with the weapon) can best track and/or illuminate 
the target. 
Example Products of Data Fusion Process: 
• Preferred shooter determination 
• Weapon-Target Pairing 
• Sensor Support for Engagements 
• Engagement Control Strategy (i.e., forward pass) 
• Engagement Preferences (intercept geometry) 
• Sensor tasking to support better situational awareness 
• Unit tasking to reposition warfare units 
• Identification of gaps in defense and recommendations to 
close gaps 
• Threat identifications and prioritizations 
• Awareness of SoS warfare resources:  health, status, 
configuration, and configuration (HSCC) 
• Situational awareness – object identification and 
characterization, map overlays, weather overlays, etc. 
Situation Prediction Capability 
• Projects the current situation into the future to estimate the enemy Course of 
Action (COA) and potential impact of the blue force’s planned actions.   
 
• Develops and assesses alternative futures or hypotheses concerning the current 
situation and possible COAs. 
 
• Assigns quantitative confidence values to potential COAs 
 
• Enables collaborative planning, effective resource management, and dynamic 
replanning 
… is key for determining that a threat requires defensive measures— 




Prediction of sensors, 
weapons, & unit performance 
• Availability & capability 
prediction 
Environment Prediction 
• Predict weather for AOI 
• Predict possible jamming/clutter 
Force Projection 
Prediction of Force Readiness 
• Prediction of overall force readiness & 
capabilities 
Wargaming – Event/Consequence Prediction 
Prediction of sensors, weapons, & unit performance 
• Predict threat 
• Predict & evaluate enemy COA & intent 
• Identify, evaluate & prioritize blue force COA 
• Evaluate effects of C2 inputs on blue force COA 
• Analyze historical trends 
Warfare Planning Capability 
… is key to predicting operational situations that require 
defensive measures (such as collaborative fire control) 
Built-in planning prior to operations is a key enabler of Distributed Resource 
Management: 
• Establishing prioritization schemes for missions, threats, defended areas, weapons, tactics 
• Establishing rule sets to guide resource behavior for tactical and strategic operations 
• Establishing parameters to control engageability calculations, target-weapon pairing, target 
identification/threat evaluation, & sensor tasking   
• Establishing decision logic 
Deliberate Planning is the predetermination 
of resource utilization 
 
Defense Planning  - “Macro” Planning 
• Assigning resources to missions 
• Allocating areas/zones within theater 
• CINC priorities 
• Identifying critical assets 
 
Defense Design – “Micro” Planning 
• Specific TTPs 
• Rule sets 
• Initialization parameters 





Dynamic Planning Functions: 
• Replanning – dynamic creation  
of new plan 
• Refinement of plan 
• Reassignment of resources 
• Ad hoc operations 
• Alteration of rule sets 
• Reset of parameters 





Why Dynamic Planning is 
Useful: 
• Plan implementation needs to 
reflect reality 
• Resources change (things break, 
resources become unavailable) 
• Enemy prediction never 100% 
accurate (unexpected events, 
enemy COAs, & threats) 
Dynamic Planning is the modification of 
plans during operations  
 
SoS Design Characteristics 
• Each constituent system is “intelligent”:  has a replicated (identical or 
shared) situational awareness and arrives at replicated decisions for BMC2 
• Lateral influences dominate vertical (hierarchical) influences 
• SoS adaptation is possible, encouraged, and necessary 
• SoS must be robust (resilient to external forces)  
• Emergent capabilities are projected to include the force-level optimization of 
the use of the assets and enhanced situational awareness across the force 
• SoS must maintain a strong self-identity 
 
 
• Each constituent system can operate 
independently or as a collaborating 
member of an SoS 
• Individual systems may enter and exit 
SoS’s 
• Multiple SoS’s may exist 
• Multiple warfare mission areas can be 
addressed by single or multiple SoS’s 
• Constituent systems have the ability to 
“self-organize” 
 


















Independent Operation of 
Constituent Systems 
• Each constituent system can operate independently or 
as a collaborating member of an SoS 
Each system is empowered as an intelligent agent and is fully-equipped 
to operate independently as operationally necessary 
• Individual systems may enter and exit a SoS 
Examples:  Mobile systems (aircraft, ships, etc.) may move into (or out 
of) the range of an SoS; system degradation or destruction may result in 
a system exiting an SoS 
Systems need to get caught up to speed upon entering a SoS 
(data/information download and synchronization) 
SoS must acknowledge systems that join – “handshake” 
Systems must provide information concerning their warfare resources 
and SA knowledge to SoS upon entering 
• Constituent systems have the ability to “self-organize” 
Each system, empowered as an intelligent agent, can form a SoS with 





• Future warfare SoS’s must be robust (resilient to external 
forces)  
• Robustness refers to resilience to changes in understanding, 
interpretation, and context 
• Perturbation for SoS is inevitable, may not be known 
beforehand, and emergent patterns/properties may develop 
in response 
 
• Methods of achieving SoS robustness through design: 
– Knowledge of operational environment (SA) 
– Internal SoS monitoring 
– Design  flexibility to respond to anticipated SoS deviations 
– Feedback to adjust over the mission performance of the 
SoS 
SoS Communications 
Communications, within and external to the SoS, are essential 
to ensure solution viability in the face of emergence. 
“Channels” are proposed as a method for SoS communication: 
Operations Channel – direct exchange between SoS subsystems 
Coordination Channel – to monitor regulatory mechanisms for SoS standardization 
Algedonic Channel – a direct link between subsystems and the SoS level for 
identification of high level threats 
Command Channel – for high-level direction throughout the SoS 
Audit or Operational Monitoring Channel – to examine SoS disturbances/health 
Environmental Screening Channel – continuous monitoring of trends, patterns, 
and events in the environment 
Resource Bargain-Accountability Channel – negotiation between the SoS and the 
constituent subsystems concerning resource distribution 
Dialog Channel – to support the examination and interpretation of SoS decisions, 
actions, and events 
Learning Channel – the detection and correction of SoS errors 
Informing Channel – routine transmission of information throughout the SoS 
Identity Channel – to support the exploration of the essence of the SoS – the  
purpose, mission and character 
Context 
Context – the circumstances, factors, conditions, and 
patterns that both enable and constrain a complex 
system solution; it’s deployment; and it’s 
interpretation 
 
- For the future warfare SoS, the context can dominate the 
solution space (even more so than technical aspects) 
 
- Context is a critical consideration for developing SoS’s 
 
- Context considerations for SoS’s: technical, operational, 





Pluralism – the characteristic of having multiple 
purposes and objectives in play at the individual, 
entity, and enterprise levels. 
 
- Differences in purposes may become sources of conflict at 
various points in the development of the SoS. 
- The assumption that an SoS has a singular set of agreed-
upon requirements and shared understandings may be 
questionable 
- This is problematic for SE approaches based on rational-
logical assumptions of objective/requirement alignment 
- For SoS’s, pluralism suggests that different objectives may be 
pursued in response to patterns and properties that 
manifest through SoS operation 
 
 
SoS Requirements Specification 
- Due to emergence and adaptation, the system 
design of an SoS can only be partially specified in 
advance of system operation 
 
- Overspecification of system-level requirements is: 
(1) wasteful of scarce resources necessary to monitor and control 
system level performance 
(2) reduces subsystem autonomy, which in turn restricts the agility 
and responsiveness of the system to compensate for 
environmental shifts. 
(3) fails to permit subsystem elements to self-organize based on 
their contextual knowledge, understanding, and proximity to the 
operating environment. 
Boundaries 
Boundaries in an SoS are ambiguous, fluid, 
and negotiable. 
 
• They provide the criteria for what is included and 
excluded from an SoS 
• Boundaries may form around geographic, time, 
spatial, or conceptual delineations 
• SoS boundaries may shift radically; particularly in 
the early formation of the problem domain; and 
also during operations 





• Maintenance of a strong SoS identity is key to SoS 
viability, robustness, and continued existence 
• There may be many decisions, actions, and 
interpretations necessary for an SoS to function in 
the face of changing objectives, operational 
missions, perturbations, etc. 
• Thus, a stabilizing force is required that acts as a 
reference point for consistency in decisions, actions, 
and interpretations 
• A strong SoS self-identity is the driving force that 
establishes the set of characteristics that is the 
essence of the SoS 
In conclusion, this presentation is intended to 
raise questions that will lead to further study.  Here 
are some topics of interest: 
 
• Study the application of SoS systems engineering (SoSE) & 
complex systems engineering (CSE) as methodologies 
• Understand and quantify the BMC2 system tempo, the threat 
environment tempo, and analyze and compare the tempos to 
identify disconnects 
• Determine what a sufficient level of SE completeness would be—
develop a strategy to determine when the level of confidence in 
the design is acceptable 
• Study the SoS against disturbances – is there enough 
redundancy and sub-optimization to compensate for 
disturbances? 








Remote Fire Forward Pass 
Engage on Remote Launch on Remote 
Control of the in-flight missile is 
handed off (or forward passed) 
to another unit to complete the 
intercept.    
     Remote unit makes decision that firing ship 
should launch. 
     Firing ship launches interceptor. 
     Remote unit (in this example) controls 
engagement (threat tracking, interceptor 
guidance, etc.). 
      The best shooter is selected based on 
optimum engagement geometry and 
engageability determination.  PSD can be 
performed in conjunction with any of the 
other IFC variants.  PSD is, in effect, Force-







     Firing Unit launches interceptor & 
passes engagement control to Remote Unit 
     Remote Unit takes over engagement 
control – tracks threat, passes guidance to 




The decision to launch is made 
by a remote unit.  Engagement 











     Remote unit provides FCQ threat data. 
     Firing ship launches interceptor based on 
remote threat data. 
     Remote unit continues to control 
engagement (compute & provide interceptor 
guidance, etc.) based on remote data. 
One or more remote sensors 
provide data upon which all (or 












Remote sensor detects threat. 
Local unit receives cue. 
Local unit tasks local sensor to detect 
and track threat. 
A cue is received from a remote 











     Remote unit provides FCQ threat data. 
     Firing ship launches interceptor based on 
remote threat data. 
     Local unit tasks local sensor to provide 
FCQ threat data for remainder of post-
launch engagement cycle. 
Remote sensor data is used to 
initiate a missile launch 












The optimum weapon from a 
group of warfare units is 
selected to intercept a threat. 
Threat 
1 
1 
